Staat v. Holsinger, 115 Ariz. 89, 563 P.2d 888 (1977) Holsinger argued that he was denied equal protection under the law because his co-accused (his wife) was also convicted of first-degree murder for the same crime, but was sentenced to life imprisonment. The differences in sentences were not mitigating, as the judge who convicted Holsinger and his wife found that their involvement was relatively small compared to Holsinger`s. Holsinger had the first personal contact with one of the people hired to murder the victim. Holsinger, who was not the co-accused, expressed a motive for the crime, provided the murder weapon, promised that anyone who committed the crime would receive something valuable for committing the crime, and gave the killer $750.00. But Richmond contrasts with State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 870 P.2d 1097, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 934 (1994).
In Gallegos, the accused and an accomplice raped and killed an eight-year-old girl, then disposed of her body. The DNA evidence found on the girl linked the accused, but not the accomplice, to the crime. The accused confessed and implicated complink, which denied any involvement. Both men were charged, but the charges against the accomplice were later dropped without prejudice due to lack of forensic evidence. When called as a defense witness, the accomplice invoked his Fifth Amendment right. The trial judge sentenced the accused to death. On appeal, the respondent argued that the judge should have taken into account the status of the accomplice in mitigating the trial. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, stating that a discrepancy between the sentences of a defendant sentenced to death and an accomplice who received a lesser sentence “will not apply if there is insufficient evidence to charge the other party to the alleged crime.” The court found that the accomplice had failed to reach an agreement or plead guilty to a lesser crime.
He had not testified against the accused and firmly maintained his innocence. Since the accomplice “to. Proven guilt, . His fate could not be compared to that of a convicted murderer. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. c. 20, 870 p.2d c. 1116. However, these distinctions are compromised by State v. (Michael) Apelt, 176 Ariz.
349, 861 P.2d 634 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 834 (1994). In the Apelt case, a less culpable accomplice was granted full immunity in exchange for her confession and the defendant`s involvement in the crime, as well as her testimony in court. Remarkably, this accomplice gave decisive testimony. In fact, her testimony was so important to the prosecution that the accused and her brother conspired to have her murdered while awaiting trial. According to the distinction between Richmond and Gallego, the Tribunal should have taken this fact into account in order to mitigate the situation. But neither the judge nor the Arizona Supreme Court did. In fact, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the defendant`s appellate argument that the accomplice`s immunity should have been a mitigating circumstance, holding that “the necessity of [the accomplice`s] testimony and her lesser involvement in conspiracy and murder, her more lenient treatment is not a mitigating factor.” Apelt, 176 ariz. at 368, 861 pp.2d at 653.
Cf. Lambright, 138 ariz. at 75-76, 673 pp.2d to 13-15 (where the equally guilty accomplice enjoyed full immunity and the testimony of the accomplice was not at all decisive for the prosecution of the accused, since the accused was imprisoned and had confessed, the court was deeply “troubled” by such an “appalling” inequality and warned that such a fact could be given “weight” in the proportionality test; Nevertheless, the death penalty was upheld). * Statement v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 786 P.2d 395 (1989) The court reduced the accused`s sentence to life imprisonment, finding that the “dramatic discrepancy” between the defendant`s death sentence and his co-accused`s four-year sentence was an important mitigating factor that the trial court had not taken into account at all. The trial court found that the co-accused`s sentence was not disproportionate to the defendant`s sentence, as the evidence against each individual was different. But a probation officer testified that in her opinion, the co-accused`s four-year sentence was a “travesty of justice.” Both the accused and his co-accused were initially charged with first-degree murder. In addition, the state demanded a complicit investigation in the trial against the accused and argued a theory of complicity before the jury. A jury note said the jury was considering whether the co-accused, who had already been convicted of murder, delivered the fatal blow. While the court acknowledged the difficult tactical decisions that must sometimes be made by the prosecutor to reach a conviction, it “makes no difference whether the dramatic deviation is due to tactical considerations in the trial or who won the race to the prosecutor`s door.” Once the prosecution has obtained such a conviction, a “discrepancy between the sentences imposed on accomplices of the kind that occurred in this case must be taken into account and may be considered a mitigating circumstance” in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty. Some proponents of prison reform and prison abolition have argued that race and gender are both valid grounds for different sentences.
In 2016, Mirko Bagaric argued that African Americans and Indigenous Australians should receive a sentence reimbursement for all but the most serious crimes, in part to compensate for unacknowledged bias to the contrary, while women “should be treated more lenient if they commit the same crime as a man” – in which case he made no exceptions for serious crimes. [14] In the UK, Jean Corston`s 2007 report, which was intended as a “review of women with particular vulnerabilities in the criminal justice system,” is described as meaning that “prisons should be abolished for all but a few,”[15] which Corston justified on the grounds that “equality does not mean treating everyone equally.” She suggested that “prison sentences for women be reserved for serious and violent offenders who pose a threat to the public” and that an open separation of men`s and women`s convictions under the equality legislation then pending could be considered. [16] Some feminists argue that giving women lighter sentences is infantilizing, stereotypical, and incompatible with gender equality. [17] [18] Staat v. Maturana, 180 Ariz. 126, 882 P.2d 933 (1994) The co-accused was sentenced to life imprisonment. The court agreed with the trial court that this inequality in sentencing was not a mitigating circumstance. The accused was 32 years old at the time of the murder. The co-accused was 20 years old. The accused planned and initiated the attack. He shot the victim several times before the co-accused attacked the dying victim with a machete. He bragged to a friend about how he had fired the rifle several times and described how he had planned the murder.
The accused committed this crime on probation for three previous convictions, including one for violent assault. The co-accused`s life sentence was not a mitigating circumstance. Gallegos v. Gallegos (Gallegos I), 178 Ariz. 1, 870 P.2d 1097 (1994) Gallegos claimed that the victim`s half-brother, George, was involved in the harassment and suffocation of the victim and in the disposal of the body. The only evidence linking George to the crime was Gallegos` testimony. Although George was initially arrested along with Gallegos for the crime, DNA testing of evidence at the crime scene revealed that George could not have been included as a contributor to the evidence. The state then dismissed the lawsuit against George on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence. Although the court sometimes considers the difference in conviction between the co-defendants to be a mitigating circumstance, this consideration “does not apply if there is insufficient evidence to charge the other party to the alleged crime.” George did not reach an agreement or plead guilty to a lesser offence, and he did not testify against Gallegos. He has always denied any involvement in the crime. Although the defense called George as a witness in court and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, George is presumed innocent until proven guilty and his fate cannot be compared to that of a convicted murderer.
If evidence is found in the future linking George to this crime, he could be charged with the murder because the charges were dismissed without prejudice. Staat v. Koch, 170 Ariz. 40, 821 P.2d 731 (1991) Cook argued that the trial court did not consider as a mitigating circumstance the fact that Cook`s equally guilty co-defendant had been sentenced to twenty years` imprisonment on the basis of a plea.