Conversely, a “recognizable group” of judges or potential judges refers to the common trait or trait between them that distinguishes them from others, such as race, ethnicity and gender. A litigant is generally prohibited from eliminating jurors belonging to the same identifiable group as a party or litigant by means of discriminatory and compelling challenges if that distinction is the basis of the challenge. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 54 USLW 4425 (U.S.Ky., April 30, 1986) (No. 84-6263), the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that prosecutors cannot use compelling challenges to exclude African Americans from a jury solely on the basis of race. Over the years, other cases have expanded the scope of protected or “recognizable” jury groups to include gender, religion and socioeconomic status. Note: The systematic exclusion of members of a recognizable panel from a jury violates the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which requires jurors to be chosen from groups of jurors representing a cross-section of the community. The adjective “recognizable” has two different (and unrelated) uses in the field of law.
A recognizable claim or controversy is one that meets the basic criteria of feasibility of being heard or decided by a particular court. The term means that the claim or controversy falls within the power or jurisdiction of a particular court. It is easy to recognize cognition – in recognizable and other English words related to knowledge: cognitive, incognito, precognition and recognition, for example. They all come from the Latin cognÅscere (“to know” or “to acquire knowledge”). Cognizable was founded in the 17th century. It is formed from the root of knowledge, which in German means “knowledge” or “consciousness.” The knowledge can be traced back to cognÅscere via the Anglo-French conoisance and conoissant, which means “consciously” or “consciously”. Cognizable has been used in its legal sense almost from its inception, and this meaning is still the most common today. The most notable of these four were the court`s involvement in legal fees and the applicant`s inability to obtain funding. Contrary to the general rule that each party must bear its own legal costs, the court found that the plaintiff`s attorney fees constituted identifiable damage, since the plaintiff would have been compelled to hire a lawyer to protect himself from the firm`s abuse of loyalty. The court found that the plaintiff was seeking fees as damages and not as reimbursement of legal fees.
And regarding the plaintiff`s inability to obtain funding, the court ruled: The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled on a motion to dismiss a claim and allowed a client to sue his former law firm for breach of fiduciary duty due to an alleged conflict of interest. The court ruled that each of the following cases constituted a legally identifiable breach by the client: attorneys` fees in that claim; the cost of finding a replacement lawyer; the client`s inability to obtain financing; and honoraria paid to the Society during the dispute. The company argued that the plaintiff did not seek legally identifiable damages. The plaintiff sought four specific damages: (1) attorneys` fees related to this litigation; (2) the cost of seeking legal counsel to replace the firm; 3. the inability to obtain financing as a result of the attempted takeover of the competitor; and (4) fees paid to Company during the Dispute. The court concluded under Pennsylvania law that any form of harm was legally recognizable. Airgas, Inc. v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 2010 WL 3046586 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (e) Claims for damage, loss or destruction of public property.
This disclaimer has been prepared by Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. It is not intended to provide legal advice for a particular situation or to establish an attorney-client relationship. Importance of opinionThis report shows the types of alleged damages sufficient to support a fiduciary breach claim in Pennsylvania. On a broader level, this shows that even if a dispute does not warrant disqualification (as in the Delaware trial), it can still support a fiduciary breach claim (as in the Pennsylvania trial). That damage is rightly alleged because [the applicant] adduces sufficient facts to enable the Court to conclude that it is plausible that [the representation of the undertaking] of [competitors], together with and against its representation of [the applicant], enabled [competitors], allegedly armed with intimate knowledge of [the applicant`s] financing plans, to be found intimate, to launch their takeover attack at a time: when [the applicant] was planning additional funding or refinancing.