A state that provides military support to another does not itself establish a proxy relationship, even if the recipient is at war. When a sponsor is able to achieve his or her own goals “thanks, with and thanks” to the efforts of the sponsored party, elements of such a relationship arise. Simply put, proxy wars make it easier for a sponsoring country or organization to achieve goals without tying its own forces directly into the conflict. It does not matter that the interests are shared between both parties – but that the sponsor has this interest regardless of the relationship. Finally, transparency mechanisms serve to advance the application of the international legal framework for proxy wars in two ways. First, these mechanisms subject the activities of sponsoring Governments to the scrutiny of their citizens and the international community. This can help exert public pressure for established standards. Second, the data generated by these mechanisms provide information that shapes an understanding of national and global activities in support of proxy groups. This type of monitoring can improve the identification of government support for powers of attorney that is inconsistent with the state`s legal obligations. At worst, proxy wars can involve sponsors in wars they wanted to avoid.
In the case of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, miscalculations can lead to escalation, especially when Ukrainian fighters operate from outside sanctuaries in neighboring countries – Russia has already launched airstrikes against bases in western Ukraine, just eleven miles from the border with Poland. For the US and its allies, waging an indirect war against Russia is less risky than launching direct hostilities, which would almost certainly involve imposing a no-fly zone. But none of these options are without risk. According to article 8 of the draft articles, the conduct of individuals may be directly attributable to the host State in which the individuals operate under the direction and control of the sponsoring State. In reality, this sets a high threshold rarely reached in proxy wars. The expert working group noted that sponsor control over such powers of attorney might be rare in practice. Security forces of all kinds go to great lengths to maintain their independence. The Working Group of Experts and this post use the term “proxy war” to refer to relations in which a sponsor supports another party with the specific intention that the Party engage in activities aimed at promoting the sponsor`s objectives in armed hostilities. The study also examined how security partnerships of various types affect proxy warfare. For example, the U.S.
is supporting combat operations in Yemen that are part of a broader proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. U. Support for the Saudi-led coalition does not necessarily make the coalition a proxy for the United States. In fact, the government of Saudi Arabia has its own agenda in Yemen and does not operate under U.S. direction and control. Whether or not the United States retains control of the parties to the conflict, international law states that the United States can always take responsibility for any illegal actions of the parties to the conflict that it supports. The appeal of proxy warfare is therefore not difficult to understand. But this comes with inherent limitations. In proxy wars, state sponsors try to wage war cheaply.
But to reap this benefit, they must sacrifice some control. And this loss of control creates strategic risks. The support of a high-powered patron, for example, can encourage proxies to take excessive risks, which can trigger unwanted escalation – a classic example of bad incentives known as moral hazard. Proxies can use the aid flow for their own purposes, divert resources to preferred constituencies, and deploy troops trained and armed by foreign patrons for unintended purposes. Weapons supplied to proxies are difficult to track and easily diverted. Local partners always have their own objectives, which may or may not coincide with those of their Western funders. To complement safeguards, some countries – including the United States – have put in place capacity-building mechanisms. While protection measures often aim to prevent aid from reaching the wrong actors, capacity building aims to enable beneficiaries to use aid responsibly. These mechanisms include training on the appropriate use of weapons systems and relevant legal obligations.
It also includes strengthening institutional capacity to establish or improve the ability of partner forces to manage forces and materiel and hold their personnel accountable for abuses. The United Nations does not wage war (or proxy war): its military peacekeeping actions are rather police actions. [1] To give just one example, in 2006, the Independent Commission on Iraqi Security Forces concluded that the federal police (then called the National Police) was involved in sectarian attacks and should be disbanded. They never were. Instead, the Defense Ministry continued to seek funding for federal policing through 2019. The federal police have hardly reformed. In late 2019, federal police were implicated in the unlawful killing of protesters in Iraq. This should be a wake-up call for the United States that, no matter how much its short-term gains, proxies who flout the rule of law will never bring long-term stability to the countries in which it operates. By complying with its own legal obligations to sponsor proxies and implementing the above recommendations, the United States can avoid such breaches in the future. Some observers may balk at the idea that proxy wars involve support for state security forces. But any analysis that does not take into account both interstate relations and state support for non-state actors would not provide a complete picture of what motivates proxy war.
Research has shown that “in the 114 civil wars between 1946 and 2002, in which at least 900 people were killed, no rebel group received major conventional weapons without the government also receiving weapons from another source.” Another common motivator is the presence of a security dilemma. A nation can use military intervention to install a more favorable government in a third country. Rival nations may perceive intervention as a weakened position for their own security and may respond by trying to undermine these efforts, often by supporting parties that benefit their own interests (for example, those directly or indirectly under their control, sympathetic to their cause, or ideologically aligned).