Under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), law enforcement agencies require certain telecommunications operators and manufacturers to incorporate surveillance capabilities into their systems or services necessary to comply with lawful requests for information. This article, titled “Cyber Crimes: An Ethical Dilemma” by Keshav Basotia, delves deeper into the ethical concerns of cybercrime. Read here to learn more. “The modern thief can steal more with a computer than with a gun. The terrorists of tomorrow could do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb. – National Research Council, USA. Read More » The computer can be the target of criminal computer attacks such as unauthorized use of computer facilities, alteration or destruction of information, sabotage of data files and vandalism against a computer system. Computers have been shot, stabbed, bypassed and bombed. Yes. The Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 is the primary legal mechanism for prosecuting cybercrimes, including hacking, and also covers certain related exorbitant crimes, such as those related to ransomware. In Van Buren v.
U.S., 140 p. Ct. 2667 (2020), the Supreme Court significantly limited the CFAA`s ability to punish insider threats. In addition to federal laws, many states have passed laws prohibiting hacking and other cybercrimes, some of which go beyond the federal laws described. New York, for example, prohibits knowingly using a computer with the intent to access computer equipment (intrusion), N.Y. Penal Law § 156.10, with penalties of up to four years in prison. New York is just one example; Dozens of such laws exist. The decision as to the applicable law depends on several factors in the light of the conflict-of-law rules, in particular the place of the alleged act and the whereabouts of the persons concerned. 244 Cyber Attack Capability of U.S. Technology, Policy, Law, and EthicsBOX 7.1 Self-defence and self-help Article 51 recognizes the right of a nation to use armed force to defend itself, including the situation in which it is the target of an armed attack, even without the authorization of the Security Council. (Whether a nation can retaliate militarily without Security Council authorization if it is the target of a use of force on the verge of armed attack is less clear, with evidence supporting both sides of this position.1 Although the term “self-defense” is not defined in the UN Charter, It is convenient to consider three different types of actions, all of which involve the use of force in response to an attack. ¢ A Type 1 action is an application of force used to stop, contain or mitigate an attack in the project.
Type 1 actions do not apply after the attack ends, as all the damage that the attack can cause has already been done by that time. A Type 2 action is a use of force in which a nation is the first to resort to violence because it has good reason to conclude that it must be attacked and there is no other alternative that preempts such action. Type 2 actions are sometimes referred to as predictive self-defense actions.2 ⢠A Type 3 action is a use of force to reduce the likelihood that the initial attacker will continue attacks in the future. Type 3 actions are based on the assumption that the initial attacker has a series of attacks in mind, only one of which took place, and can be considered a kind of predictive self-defense against these likely future attacks. An example of a Type 3 operation is the El Dorado Canyon bombing in Libya in 1986, which was justified as an act of self-defense against an ongoing Libyan-sponsored terrorist threat against the United States. Citizens.3 (Note that under domestic law, as it applies to individuals, Type 3 measures are generally not lawful, although Type 1 measures taken in self-defence are sometimes justified under common law, as discussed in section 5.2.) Many countries, including the United States, have claimed rights under the Charter of the United Nations to all three types of measures in self-defence. At the same time, other countries (especially the target of such an action) have claimed that a Type 3 action is in fact an unlawful retaliatory measure – that is, an act of punishment or revenge. In the context of a cyberattack and active defense, a Type 1 action is equivalent to an active threat neutralization – a cyberattack launched in response to an incoming cyberattack designed to neutralize the threat and prevent further damage. A Type 3 action is a cyberattack designed to prevent the attacker from launching further attacks in the future. The difference between Type 1 and Type 3 actions is important because a Type 3 action is technically easier to perform than a Type 1 action under certain circumstances. For example, it can easily happen that an incoming cyberattack can be identified as coming from Zendia and that the Zendian National 254 Technology, Policy, Law, And Ethics Of U.S. Cyberattack CapabiliTIES and the proper functioning of a vast infrastructure, itself increasingly controlled by information technology.
Acts that significantly interfere with the functioning of that infrastructure can reasonably be considered to be a use of force, whether or not they cause direct physical harm. Thus, cyberattacks against information technology control over a country`s infrastructure, which have a significant impact on the functioning of that infrastructure (whether or not they have caused immediate large-scale death or destruction of property), would constitute an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51, as would a kinetic attack that would somehow shut down the system without these immediate side effects. How far should a cyberattack on a country`s infrastructure go before it is considered a use of force or an armed attack? The magnitude of the impact is an important factor in distinguishing between armed attack and the use of force. For example, an armed attack would likely involve an application of force that leads to a significant effect. It is not clear whether there are differentiating factors other than the effect scale. (Neither “armed attack” nor “use of force” necessarily requires the use of conventional kinetic weapons.) Schmitt`s examples of cyberattacks, which are considered violence and not, are useful in establishing a continuum of proportions.16 On the one hand, Schmitt argues that a cyberattack on an air traffic control system that results in a plane crash and numerous fatalities is clearly considered a use of force. while a computer network attack on a single university computer network aims to disrupt military research in campus labs. No. Between these two ends of the spectrum lie a number of problematic cases (Box 7.4) that raise a number of questions.
¢ How long does a serious disruption to critical infrastructure have to last at least for it to be considered violence or an armed attack? (This is not to say that time is the only variability that plays a role in such an assessment.) Under what circumstances can a non-lethal and persistent but reversible cyberattack that interferes with the functionality of a target network (e.g. against a photo reconnaissance satellite) be considered a use of force or an armed attack? ¢ Under what circumstances, if any, a cyberattack (e.g. against the data of a stock exchange, against a factory process), whose disruptive but not really destructive effects accumulate slowly and gradually, are considered the use of force or armed attack? 16 Michael Schmitt, “Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 37:885-937, 1999.