Before moving on to the leading candidates for legal interpretation, it is worth considering the recurring suggestion that interpretation only takes place when the answer to a question of law is not obvious. [1] We can quickly do without this proposal. He does not grasp what paradigmatic theories of legal interpretation are interested in, because the recipes offered by these theories apply to both simple and difficult problems. In addition, the unfortunate consequence of the proposal would be that the interpretation of the law would not be a single subject. (From chemistry, compare chemical reactions that are already well understood.) Whether you are looking for the linguistic meaning, the content of the law or the best solution to a dispute, you are in the same company when the problems are simple as when they are difficult. A closely related point is that it depends on the interpreter whether a particular legal issue is easy or difficult. For an experienced tax lawyer, the answer to an obscure tax question may be obvious. The proposal would therefore mean that what constitutes an interpretation of the law would depend on who interprets it (and when). It remains to be seen whether this new empirical data will influence how judges use established interpretive tools such as ordinary meaning, canons and legislative history. Theoretically, both purposivism and textualism seek the objectively most reasonable meaning of a law, rather than trying to discern the real intent of Congress with respect to the question before the court.518 Teleposivists ask what a reasonable legislature would have tried to accomplish by passing this law,519 while textualists ask what a reasonable English speaker would have tried to convey.520 By intent, these theories are already removed from the “real intent” of Congress. 521 Accordingly, judges may conclude that evidence of actual practice, whether evidence from common language corpora or evidence from congressional staff of legislative editorial practices, is irrelevant.522 (1) A judge should not act if it is likely that the organization will be involved in proceedings that would normally be brought before the judge: or is regularly involved in litigation before a court.
See, for example, Posner, Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, note 118, p. 807 (“A. The line of defense is that even if the canons don`t make much sense, it`s better for judges to feel constrained by certain rules of interpretation than to move freely through a forest of difficult questions of interpretation. For many years, some eminent scholars (such as Robert Bork) have argued that when interpreting the Constitution, one must examine the original intent of the people who drafted, proposed, adopted, or ratified the Constitution to determine what those people wanted to convey through the text.61 According to this view, the original intent can be found in sources outside the text. such as the debates at the Constitutional Convention or in the Federalist Papers.62 For example, in Myers v. United States,63 Chief Justice William Howard Taft, writing for the majority, concluded that the President did not require legislative consent to remove an executive officer who exercised a purely executive function.64 The court sought to determine the original meaning of the President`s power to remove him by reference to English common law, to the archives of the Constitutional Convention, and the proceedings of the First Congress, among other sources.65 Citing these various sources, Chief Justice Taft wrote in his opinion to the Court that “the debates of the Constitutional Convention indicated the intention to create a strong executive.” 66 In particular, in Myers, the Court did not refer to any source capable of indicating what ordinary citizens living at the time of its incorporation thought of the President`s power to dismiss. The discussion is necessarily condensed and references to other documents are provided. The focus is on legal and constitutional interpretation, with much of the discussion focusing on limitations and corresponding changes in the interpretation of by-laws and private instruments such as contracts and wills. The interpretation of judicial decisions is a matter that is best dealt with separately. See entry on precedent and analogy in legal justification. However, not all jurists and judges have responded to legal realism by advocating a vision of legislative primacy in the interpretation of the law. Canon 3C(1)(c).
In criminal proceedings, a victim who has the right of return is not a party to the proceedings or to the subject-matter of the dispute. A judge who has a financial interest in the victim of a crime is not required under Canon 3C(1)(c) to exclude from criminal proceedings, but the judge must do so if the judge`s impartiality could reasonably be challenged under Canon 3C(1) or if the judge has an interest that could be significantly affected by the outcome of the Canon 3C(1)(d)(iii) proceedings.