Before we start with our topic (common intention and common goal), we need to understand the basics of responsibility, that is, “the common intention can develop in the course of a struggle. The peculiarity of the section is the element of participation in the action. The liability of a person for an offence committed by another person in the course of an offence committed by more than one person derives from Article 34 when such an offence is committed in order to promote a common intention of the person involved in the commission of the offence. Direct evidence of common intent is rarely available and, therefore, such intent can only be inferred from the circumstances arising from the proven facts of the case and the proven circumstances. (Sachin Jana & Another vs State of West Bengal, 2008 (2) Scale 2 SC) The Supreme Court had provided that the existence of a common intention and “the involvement of the defendant in the commission of a crime” were the essential factors for the application of article 34. In addition, it has been provided that a common intention, even if there is no obvious act of the accused, is invoked in article 34 as the responsibility of the enforcement agent, which is not the other way around. [4] It is plausible to confuse the common intention with a similar intention, but the appropriate application of the law distinguishes the two in the light of several jurisprudences. Therefore, understanding the nuances of common intent, as opposed to similar intentions, has become inexplicably important for achieving the goals of justice, for properly granting criminal responsibility for a crime involving more than one person. (3) The allegation that the complainant was physically unable to do so because of the sixty per cent.
Disability due to poliomyelitis on his lower limbs, holding the hand of the deceased can not be accepted. The inapplicability of the article is therefore not an obstacle to the conviction of the defendant under the substantive part in connection with article 34, if the evidence reveals the commission of an offence in support of the common intention of all; Nethala Pothuraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1991) Cr LJ 3133 (SC). “It also means the evil or evil intent to commit a criminal act, but not necessarily the same crime that is committed.” The most specific principle of joint responsibility in criminal law, resulting from the common will of the accused persons, was examined under Article 34 of the ICC. That article reads as follows: “If there is no indication of intent or plan agreed in advance, the mere fact that the two accused were seen at the scene or that the two accused shot at them, causing the death of one of the individuals and two other simple injuries, could not be considered sufficient to assume a common intention.” In the recent case of Jagan Gope v. State of W.B.[14], the court noted: “In a case like this, each would be individually responsible for the harm they caused, but no one would be convicted on behalf of the actions of one of the others; If the prosecution cannot prove that his separate blow was fatal, he cannot be convicted of the murder, but a clear intent to kill could be proven in this case. The common intention is called a pre-agreed plan that acts jointly according to the plan. It must be proved that the offence was committed in accordance with the plan agreed in advance. It occurs before the act is ordered at the right time, but there does not have to be a long interval. The gap does not have to be long, sometimes the common intention can be developed on the ground. The basic factor is a pre-agreed plan to execute the plan for the desired outcome. Each of these persons is responsible for an act taken to promote the common intention, as if the act had been committed by a person.
The common intention does not mean the similar intention of several people.